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Abstract - Network Address Translation or NAT, is a
technology that is used to translate internal addresses to
globally routable addresses on the internet. NAT continues to
be used extensively in almost every network due to the current
lack of IPv4 addresses.
Despite being exceptionally
commonplace, this networking technique is not without its
weaknesses, and can be disabled with a fairly straightforward
attack. By overpopulating the translation table, the primary
mechanism used to translate the internal to external
addresses, an attacker can effectively deny all internal users
access to the external network. This paper takes an in-depth
look at how five different vendors: Cisco, Extreme, Linksys,
VMWare, and Vyatta, implement the translation table during
active NAT sessions and how they are affected by TCP, UDP,
and ICMP variations of the DOS attack.
Keywords: Computer Network Security, Denial of Service,
Network Address Translation, NAT
Track: Network Security Engineering

1 Introduction
Network Address Translation is a technology that is
so widely deployed, it can be found in almost every home and
in every company that has an enterprise network. With the
scarcity of public IPv4 addresses, NAT with port translation
has become a necessity when organizations need to provide
Internet access to multiple users on the inside of their
network. Devices that do the translations keep track of these
connections in the NAT translation table. This table maps
inside and outside ports and IP addresses so that internal hosts
can have multiple concurrent conversations with the outside
world. However, this creates a single point of failure in the
network. If the translation table becomes too full or nonfunctional, the internal network could suffer connectivity
issues when trying to reach the global network. This makes
translation tables a prime candidate for denial of service
attacks by a malicious user.
Therefore, it is important to understand how different
vendors handle translation table behavior, especially in an

enterprise environment which contains devices from multiple
vendors. This paper will analyze how several different
vendors handle NAT translation table size and how the
devices react once the tables have been filled to capacity.
Additionally, this paper will determine whether or not a small
number of devices on the inside network can easily and
effectively deny service to other users on the network by
targeting the translation table on these NAT devices.

2 Background and Problem Statement
NAT is a networking function that is widely
deployed in networks today. The IETF defines NAT as a
"method by which IP address are mapped from one realm to
another, in an attempt to provide transparent routing to hosts"
[3].
NAT with Port Translation or NAPT is the most
common and widely deployed version of NAT. The main
function of NAPT is the conservation of global IP addresses
by mapping a large number of private internal host addresses
to a single external host address [1]. Essentially, NAPT
provides a way for an intermediate device to map and
translate internal IP addresses and ports to an external IP
address on a different port.
One of the most important and complicated portions
of NAPT has to deal with keeping track of the sessions that
are in use. RFC 2663 identifies TCP and UDP sessions by
keeping track of the:





Source IP address
Source TCP/UDP port
Target IP address
Target TCP/UDP port

ICMP tracking is similar except that the NAPT
device keeps track of the ICMP query ID instead of TCP/UDP
ports [3]. These properties create unique entries in the
translation table and can be used to create a virtually limitless
number of permutations for use in translation.

2.1 The Problem

Figure 1: Physical Device Topology
In order to segment networks from the internet and
preserve IP addresses, businesses and households around the
world use NAT with Port Translation to map multiple internal
hosts to a small number of globally routable public IPs [3].
As far as internal users are concerned, this process is
supposed to be transparent, however if this process were to be
disrupted, multiple if not all users on the internal network
would be affected. The translation table which maps internal
ports to external ports for active connections serves as a single
point of failure and could be targeted in order to deny service
to a large number of users.
Because every conversation that is going from the
internal network to the external network has to be mapped and
tracked, NAPT is an incredibly processor intensive task when
compared to many other services a router could provide. In
addition, every packet that goes through the NAT translation
has to be rewritten; checksums need to be recalculated, along
with many other changes [1].
Consequently, the more
translations that occur, the more processor time is consumed
to perform the NAT operations.
This can lead to performance degradation for all
functions on the router if the NAT process consumes the
available processing resources. As a result, if an attacker
could create a situation where the NAT has so much work to
do that it consumes all of the resources, they could cause
failures not only for the NAT process, but also other functions
that the router is supposed to handle (access lists, routing
protocols, DHCP leases, etc.).
While there are many specifications on how NAT
with Port Translation should operate, many of the
implementation choices are not explicitly defined. Important
details such as table entry timeouts for the different protocols,
maximum translation table size, and entry tracking are left up
to the vendors [3]. If the implementation discrepancies
between vendors are significant enough, they could result in
significant impact to network performance and application
functionality. The next sections will provide scenarios that
will demonstrate these issues and will provide data we can use
to determine the differences in how each vendor implements
NAPT.

3 Experimental Design
For all tests involving physical devices, the topology
in figure 1 was constructed.
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In this diagram there are two networks, one internal
and one external. There are two normal hosts on the internal
network and an attacker that will launch an attack against the
NAT device in the middle. The outside host is there to
receive traffic and to provide an end point to determine if a
loss of connectivity occurs. The main questions here are: can
a single attacker device overwhelm the NAT device with
translations thereby blocking legitimate traffic from exiting?
What happens when the translation table on the NAT device
becomes full?
For all tests involving the VMWare Virtual NAT
Process, the topology in figure 2 was constructed.
Figure 2: Virtual Topology
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Like the physical topology there is an internal and an
external network that the attacker will attempt to disrupt.
Our hypothesis is that the attacker will be able to deny access
to the external network by targeting the translation device. By
creating a large number of translations, the attacker would be
able to deny access to the outside by either filling the
translation table or by consuming all of the available
resources on the translating device.

3.1 Default Device Timers
Since the RFC documents regarding NAT only give
recommendations on what the expiration timers should be for
TCP, UDP, and ICMP entries, the individual vendors have
their own default settings for each of these entries. These
values are important because they determine the amount of
time an attacker has to fill the table before the entries start
expiring.
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Table 2: UDP Attack Script
#!/bin/bash
for ((i=0; i<300; i++))
do
sudo nmap -sU 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null
2/dev/null &
done

Notes:
1. TCP Default refers to all translated TCP ports that are not
specified in the Cisco IOS (DNS and a few other services
have their own special timeouts).
2. Timers on the Linksys device are not configurable by the
user.
3. The vmnetnat.conf configuration file for the VMWare
NAT process does not have a configurable field for TCP
timeout. Additionally, there is no way to view the translation
table for diagnostic testing to find out the default timeout.
4. Timers on the Vyatta device are not configurable by the
user.

3.2 Attack Types
In order to determine the effects of the different
protocols on multiple platforms, we had to create a number of
scenarios. We tested attacks using TCP, UDP, and ICMP
entries into the table. Each of these three tests were done
against the five different vendors: Cisco, Extreme, Vyatta,
Linksys, and VMWare.
If the attacker proves unsuccessful in filling the
translation table for a device using the default timers, the
experiments will be repeated for that device using unlimited
timeout periods for each protocol. This will allow us to
determine the effects of the attack on the device if it were to
be successful.

3.3 Attack Scripts
The scripts used to execute the attacks were simple
bash scripts that called several concurrent sessions of NMAP.
These NMAP scans would attempt to reach various addresses
on the outside on a variety of different ports. This allows the
attacker to generate numerous translation table entries in a
very short period of time. The scripts were very similar, with
the main difference being in the –s options that changed the
protocol being used by NMAP.
Table 1: TCP Attack Script
#!/bin/bash
for ((i=0; i<300; i++))
do
sudo nmap -sS 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null

There was one alteration that had to be made during
the UDP experiment. The Cisco device would not register the
UDP entries in the translation table unless it received some
sort of reply from the outside on those ports. Therefore, the
UDP Attack Script in the Cisco scenario pointed to the outside
host instead of a range of non-existent hosts.
Table 3: Cisco UDP Attack Script
#!/bin/bash
for ((i=0; i<300; i++))
do
sudo nmap -sU 74.74.74.2
2/dev/null &
done

1>/dev/null

Table 4: ICMP Attack Script
#!/bin/bash
for ((i=0; i<300; i++))
do
sudo nmap -sP 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null
2/dev/null &
done

4 Methodology
The topology for each test was set up as shown in the
figures above with three PCs connected to a switch behind a
NAT device which then connected to an external host on the
external network. The only exception was the VMWare test
where the topology consisted of two VMs on the internal
virtual network and one physical host on the external network.
The external host was hosting an FTP server and a TFTP
server which had access one large movie file to transfer. Only
one NAT device from one vendor would be tested every time.
Each vendor device would run through the test 5 times to
ensure the validity of the data.
Before the attack began, all of the hosts issued pings
to each other to verify connectivity. This also allowed for
verification that the NAT translations were occurring
correctly between the inside network and the external
network.
After initial connectivity and translation
functionality were established, an internal host tested TCP and
UDP functionality by using FTP and TFTP between the inside
and outside. After full functionality was determined, a
unidirectional JPerf test was run between an inside host and
the outside host. This ensured that the NAT device could not

be brought down by a full load of traffic from a single device.
After all of the testing had finished, commands would be
issued to the NAT device to clear the translation table and
reset the NAT statistics when applicable.
After the verification process, the attacker would
kick off the script and a timer (on a stopwatch) would be
started. Each attack period would last for 5 minutes and then
the NMAP processes would be killed. Every minute during
the attack, internal hosts would attempt to ping the internal
gateway, the external gateway, and the outside host.
Additionally, every minute, the internal hosts would attempt
to establish an FTP and a TFTP session and attempt to
transfer a file. Also, every minute the relevant commands
would be issued to the NAT device (when applicable) to
determine the number of translations and to verify that the
correct translations were being put into the translation table.
After the attack had completed, internal hosts would
then attempt to ping each other, the internal gateway, the
external gateway, and the external host. Additionally, internal
hosts would then attempt to establish FTP and TFTP sessions
with the external hosts in order to transfer the movie file.
This process would be repeated until all attempts were
successful or until 15 minutes elapsed.
These tests would be run initially using the default
timers on the devices. However if the attacker could not fill
the translation table for a particular device with any of the
attacks, then tests would be run on that specific device using
unlimited timers. This would allow us to observe the
consequences of filling the translation table on that device.

4.1 Problems Encountered
During the course of our experiments, we did run
into a few issues during the testing. Unfortunately some of
the devices had very little or no visibility into what was
happening during the translation process. The Linksys device
was the worst for this since it did not have any relevant means
of logging NAT Translations. This problem was exacerbated
by the fact that all management for the Linksys device was inband, which became unreachable during the attack. The
VMWare NAT process also had no means to debug the
translations while they were occurring. This meant that all we
had to go on were the results of the experiments to determine
what was actually going on during the attack.
Another issue was the processing limitations of the
devices used to execute the attacks. In most cases it was a
netbook that had very little processing power, which limited
the number of translations we could do within a certain period
of time. In the other cases it was a virtual machine with very
limited resources (in the VMWare tests). We originally wrote
the scripts to loop 1000 times to maximize the number of
IMAP instances running, but ultimately had to scale it down
to 300 concurrent sessions to keep the attacking machines
from locking up.

4.2 Metrics
In order to determine whether connectivity was
affected or not, every minute of the attack we would run:
ICMP echo requests to the outside, a TFTP transfer to the
outside, and an FTP transfer to the outside. We would also
look at the current size of the translation table along with the
CPU utilization on the device in question. The final thing we
would watch for was whether or not the packets the outside
device was receiving were being translated (by looking at the
source address of the traffic).

5 Results and Discussion
The results of this experiment show that a small
number of compromised nodes with the right software can
severely impact enterprise grade equipment in a short period
of time. While almost all platforms tested were negatively
impacted by the TCP and UDP attacks, the effectiveness of
certain protocols for filling the translation tables varied from
vendor to vendor. Additionally, filling the translation tables
also had varied effects on the devices performing the NAT
translations depending on what vendor created the device.
On the Cisco device, the translations filled the
available memory on the device which not only prevented
new entries from being entered into the table (and therefore
being translated) it also caused memory allocation errors
which negatively impacted other processes that the router was
performing. The Cisco device fared better against the TCP
attacks due to its session tracking capability and the
aggressive timeouts on the SYN packets. The UDP attack on
the other hand was able to fill the table on this device and
deny translation capabilities to all other devices on the
network.
The Extreme device on the other hand, limited the
number of NAT translations allowed on one address instead
of letting it consume all of the other memory. This allowed
for smaller number of total entries, but preserved the integrity
of the device when the table was filled. The Extreme device
fared very well against both TCP and UDP attacks due to its
very aggressive default timers. However, these timers are a
double edged sword and by defying best practices and
standards laid down in the RFCs, could cause problems on a
network with higher latency times. For example, in the case
of the Extreme device, the two minute default TCP timer
could cause certain TCP applications to fail because it expires
so quickly. TCP logical connections can last for a very long
time even if connectivity is temporarily disrupted or there isn't
any traffic to send for a period of time. By expiring these
TCP entries, the internal host will have to establish a new
session to the outside and most likely start the conversation
over.
The Linksys device by far fared the worst of all the devices
that were tested. It was unable to handle the processing load
of translating such a large amount of requests and therefore
became completely unreachable during the attack. TCP and

UDP attacks were equally effective against this device.
Unfortunately, the lack of accessibility during the attack (inband management only) and limited logging made any more
insight into the operation of this device all but impossible.
While the VMWare device fared well against the
UDP attack (unlike the Cisco device) it was severely impacted
by the TCP attack. Service was denied during the attack and
unlike the rest of the devices tested, TCP and UDP
connections could no longer be established even after the
attack had ended. The only way to restore full connectivity
was to restart the VMWare NAT service. This would pose a
significant problem to network administrators since outside
connectivity would appear to be restored (ICMP echo requests
would work), but any service related applications would cease
to function. Unfortunately, the VMWare NAT process has
limited configuration and debug capabilities so determining
the exact cause of this disruption is also next to impossible.
The Vyatta device fared extremely well during these
tests. These attacks didn't appear to have any impact despite
having several thousand translations entered into the table.
Due to the resources at my disposal, the only device to test
this platform was markedly more powerful than the other
devices tested in this series of experiments. Interestingly
enough, Vyatta also defies RFC recommendations by not
allowing for the administrator to adjust any of the timers that
are used in the translation process. Additionally, while I was
unable to do so in my experiments, the default TCP timer is
extremely long and the Vyatta device doesn't appear to do any
session tracking (unlike the Extreme or Cisco devices). This
could possibly be exploited on a device that is less powerful
or being actively utilized on an enterprise network.
It is interesting to note however, that unlike when the
CAM (Content Addressable Memory) table, which holds the
MAC address / port entries, becomes full on a switch, the
NAT device does not "fail open" and pass all traffic. When
the translation table became full (in all cases where this was
possible), no new translations could occur and the NAT
devices would drop any new traffic not already in the table.
Another point to note is that the NAT devices did not FIFO
any translation entries. While expired entries were FIFO'd
out, if the table became full, the entries remained in the table
until they expired. Therefore, new entries could not be added
until the old entries expired (which could be a significant
amount of time).
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn
from these experiments is that the differing implementations
of NAT between the vendors (especially in the case of timers)
could cause interoperability issues if a connection has to
traverse a NAT device on the source end and the destination
end. While TCP connections are generally given a duly long
amount of time before expiration, UDP connection timeouts
varied greatly between the vendors. With VMWare and
Vyatta allowing only 30 seconds before the UDP entry times
out, significant application issues could occur over high
latency networks that span long distances.

The relatively small number of compromised nodes
required to execute the attack paired with the fact that NAT
generally causes a single point of failure for a large number of
users makes this a relatively easy and effective type of denial
of service attack to execute. Furthermore, while it may be
difficult to fill up a translation table on a device with a
significant amount of memory, the effects of the attack on the
processing capabilities of the NAT devices makes this attack
scalable to almost any network size. Therefore, we can
conclude that this attack is viable in an enterprise setting and
against several mainstream vendor devices that are currently
deployed.

5.1 Mitigation
The main ways that the NAT denial of service attack
takes advantage of the NAT device is to either fill up the
translation table to prevent new entries or to create so many
entries that the processor on the device cannot keep up.
Therefore the most obvious way to mitigate the effects of this
attack is to limit the number of translations that hosts are
allowed to make. Making a rule that limits the number of
overall translations allowed is common, and while this may
solve the issue of high CPU utilization, this technique makes
it easier for the attacker to fill the table and deny service to
legitimate users service. Because of this, limiting the number
of translations must be applicable to individual hosts.
Cisco has features in place in their IOS to
accomplish this goal relatively well. Most platforms support
rate limiting of some kind, but the Cisco platform supports
rate limiting by either the total number of translations, the
number of translations that can be created by a list (that
includes a number of hosts), and the number of translations a
specific host can make [6]. Obviously limiting the total
number of translations would prove counter-productive, and
while limiting the number of translations a specified host can
use is fine on a smaller network, this mitigation technique
cannot scale to a large network.
The Extreme device on the other hand supports what
the vendor calls "Auto-constraining," which limits the amount
of ports a single internal host can use at one time [7]. This
works by evenly distributing the amount of port space
between each internal user evenly [7]. While this is easy to
configure and can be effective in smaller networks, this
feature could end up preventing legitimate users from making
new connections in a scenario where there are a large number
of internal users and a very small number of external
addresses to map to.
Unfortunately, the Linksys, VMWare, and Vyatta
platforms don't appear to support any of these types of
features at all which makes stopping this type of attack much
more difficult when using these platforms.
Another feature that is built into most NAT platforms
is the ability to control the amount of time that passes before
an entry in the table expires. This is best evidenced by the

table on the Extreme device that couldn't be filled in this
experiment using the normal timers. Unfortunately the Vyatta
and Linksys platforms do not allow the administrator to
configure these timers, which makes them less able to prevent
the NAT DOS attack. However, administrators need to be
careful when setting these timers since they could time out
legitimate sessions prematurely and cause applications to
malfunction, especially in higher latency networks with a high
traffic volume.

6 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to closely examine
infrastructure security risks when using NAT with Port
Translation. Additionally, this paper analyzes the default
behavior of NAPT devices from different vendors. The
results of these experiments show that a single device on the
internal network is capable of overwhelming the translation
table. These experiments also show that the default behavior
when implementing NAPT varies significantly between
vendors. Default timers, entry behavior, and configurable
settings are all vendor specific. We believe that the almost
universal use of NAPT justifies further investigation and
standardization of its use. The reality is that most consumers
utilize NAPT and do not consider that the very mechanisms
that allow it to work can be taken advantage of to the
detriment of all internal hosts. As the various experiments
outlined in the paper show, many vendors use default
behaviors that leave their devices open to exploitation when
implementing NAPT. Furthermore, some vendors do not
even offer the ability to change crucial settings that could be
used to mitigate this type of attack.
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